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1. The Social Histories of Madness, Law, and Medicine 
 
 Wherever there is law, there is madness.  Wherever there 
are legal relations between people, there is a legal issue as 
to how those relations are affected by the insanity of one of 
the parties.  Legal treatises contain no shortage of cases 
regarding capacity to make wills, to marry, to sign contracts, 
to testify in court, to engage in criminal or civil litigation, 
or to be convicted of a crime.  Similarly, wherever there is 
madness, law is usually close by.  The Crown's jurisdiction 
over the estates and persons of lunatics and idiots had been 
codified by the early fourteenth century,
1
 and seems to have 
existed considerably earlier.
2
  Confinement of the insane has 
never been simply a medical matter:  doctors have always been 
required to apply criteria and processes defined by law.  The 
mad-doctors themselves, like other doctors and health care 
workers, have been subject to legal regulations which define 
standards of practice. 
 Historians of madness have become increasingly adventurous 
in their approaches and in the documents upon which they have 
relied in their work.  Nonetheless, legal sources have tended 
to be under-exploited.  Where they are used, they are sometimes 
not understood in their legal context, a context which may lead 
to clues or insights regarding interpretation.  This article is 
intended to alert historians of madness to the variety of legal 
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sources, and the ways in which they may assist scholars in 
their researches. 
 The social history of madness can no longer be equated (if 
it ever could) to the histories of doctoring and of medical 
science.  It now also includes the study of the experiences of 
the mad, the broader public understanding of insanity, and the 
array of social systems and power structures through which 
society controls and comprehends the individuals, and in which 
the mad individual negotiates day-to-day life. In this 
relatively broad understanding of the social history of 
madness, the relevance of legal sources is clear.  At the most 
fundamental level, law determines the rights of the insane 
person.  A finding that an individual lacks capacity to 
contract, for example, removes the authority of the individual 
to make fundamental decisions about his or her day-to-day life, 
such as how he or she will conduct their business affairs.  A 
finding of unfitness to plead in a criminal matter placed 
individuals in a legal limbo, subject to confinement without a 
finding of guilt, but unable to clear their name by challenging 
their accusers.
3
  Civil confinement, of course, resulted in the 
physical detention of the individual.  The law might thus be 
very much a part of the life of the insane person, and an 
understanding of the dynamic between the individual and the law 
is pivotal to understanding the life of the insane person.
4
 
 The law of madness is interesting to historians not merely 
because of the direct effect it has on the lives of insane 
people.  It also provides a way in which society conceived 
madness which may be juxtaposed to that of medical 
professionals. At the centre of traditional medical discourse 
are the concepts of disease and diagnosis, and the objective of 
the medical profession has long been cure or, at least, care.  
This is as true of the history of psychiatric medicine as of 
any other branch:  the medical causes of insanity have long 
been a matter of medical debate, and the relationship between 
patient and doctor has been characterized as one of cure and 
care. Pivotal to the legal discourse are instead the protection 
of society, and whether individuals are responsible for 
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themselves and their actions.  Thus the legal contexts noted 
above, with the exception of civil confinement, can be 
understood as variations on the theme of capacity 
determination, essentially a decision as to whether individuals 
can be held responsible for their decisions.  Civil confinement 
indicates the other legal priority.  At common law, confinement 
was determined on the basis of dangerousness.
5
 Clearly in 
application, there is overlap between the legal and medical 
objectives.  If individuals lack capacity or are dangerous to 
themselves or others, the question arises as to what to do with 
them.  Here, the legal system has long looked to establish 
systems of care, suggesting a point of connection with the 
medical objectives.  Nonetheless, the approaches are at their 
core quite different. 
 The differences are not merely a matter of professional 
emphasis.  They extend to the basic understanding of madness.  
In law, insanity was not a state of being or subsisting 
condition, analogous to a disease.  English law had nothing 
which corresponded to `judicial personhood' in continental 
legal systems.
6
  Instead, English law compartmentalized 
insanity.  For English law, insanity was not intrinsic to the 
individual, but was determined by the abilities of the 
individual in the context of the specific situation.  Thus for 
admission to an asylum, the statutes required it to be shown 
that an individual was 'a proper person to be taken charge of 
and detained under care and treatment'.
7
  Compare this to the 
following test, used in 1870 to determine the validity of a 
will:   
 
 It is essential to the exercise of such a power 
that a testator shall understand the nature of the 
act and its effects; shall understand the extent of 
the property of which he is disposing; shall be able 
to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he 
ought to give effect and, with a view to the latter 
object, that no disorder of mind shall poison his 
affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent 
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the exercise of his natural faculties- that no insane 
delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his 
property and bring about a disposal of it which, if 
the mind had been sound, would not have been made.
8
 
 
Various consequences of interest to historians of madness flow 
from this approach of compartmentalisation.   
 First, as a pragmatic matter of understanding the lives of 
the insane, it is and has always been procedurally very 
difficult to lose all rights at law.  For example, confinement 
in an institution did not necessarily preclude an individual 
from making a valid will or an enforceable contract. This is 
significant not merely for understanding the rights and legal 
status of the subject; it also places a particular dynamic on 
the relationship of care.  Since law did not deprive insane 
individuals of all rights, extra-legal control mechanisms such 
as surveillance or controlling access to the mad person might 
be particularly important to ensure their safety and 
appropriate conduct.
9
 
 Second, since insanity in law is bound up with a specific 
factual situation, legal determinations of insanity and 
incapacity require narration of those relevant factual 
contexts.  In some cases, such as major competency 
determinations, these narrations can be quite extensive.  The 
test of testamentary incapacity cited above gives some 
indication of the scope of evidence to be considered.  Clearly, 
the range of property of the individual was relevant; but 
equally important would be the relations with the presumed 
heirs, and whether any animosity was the result of a deluded 
imagination or instead an appropriate response to the heirs' 
waywardness or cruelty.  The court reports can thus provide 
considerable information as to the day-to-day situation of the 
alleged mad person.
10
 
 Care is appropriate to the use of the documents in this 
way, however.  The criteria applied by the courts reflected the 
substantive law in question, and just as the medical history of 
insanity is bound up with the practical history of doctoring, 
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so the legal history of insanity cannot be divorced from the 
broader history of law.  Cases regarding competency to 
contract, for example, provide specific insight into the sort 
of rationality seen to be required for contract law and, by 
extension, the conceptualization not merely of insanity but 
also of contract law itself. That provides interesting 
possibilities for research into the history of contract law, 
but, for the historian of madness, care is required.  The law 
also had policies of varying formality as to how closely it 
would scrutinize decisions.  In Evans v. Knight and Moore,
11
 for 
example, it was held that the degree of evidence necessary to 
establish testamentary capacity varied according to whether the 
will 'gave effect to probable intentions'.  In that case, the 
will was 'precisely such a disposition as natural affection 
would dictate',
12
 and testamentary capacity was found 
notwithstanding rather weak evidence.  It is at least arguable 
that this sort of result-oriented approach may colour the 
presentation of the facts in the narrative, and scholars should 
not approach these texts more naively than they would any other 
source of the period. 
 While the history of madness can no longer be reduced to 
the history of medical practice, medicine is still of course 
understood as particularly relevant to the history of insanity. 
 Here, too, legal sources have much to offer.  Law has not 
remained static over the last near-millennium, and it of course 
has been influenced by medical knowledge, particularly in the 
last two hundred years. For that same period, the appearance of 
psychiatrists as expert witnesses was arguably a strategy to 
enhance professional reputation.  This suggests pressure on 
doctors to re-formulate their ideas in a way which would be 
comprehensible to the legal system.
13
 Insofar as that process of 
re-formulation affected not merely court testimony, but also 
the doctor's daily medical practice, law can be seen as 
influencing medicine.  Certainly, the theoretical bases of law 
and medicine may have been different, but as Smith
14
 and 
Fennell
15
 have shown, law and medicine had their communal 
interests and approaches, as well as their differences. Legal 
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and medical doctrines regarding insanity are thus not merely 
open to juxtaposition; they are also a source of mutual 
influence.   
 The importance of law to medical practice can be 
considered in both structural and substantive terms.  The 
former extends beyond defining the forms needed for confinement 
of an individual, for example, although it certainly includes 
that.  Law also has a role in structuring the relationships 
among a wide variety of actors:  doctors, patients, judges, 
nurses, and health administrators.  In modern times, we know of 
the frustration of some psychiatrists at what they perceive as 
over-zealous legalism, law restricting their ability to do 
their job. This response is not restricted to the late 
twentieth century, and the tensions among different professions 
were very much part of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as well.
16
  Law provides the process in which the actors 
and discourses interact, most visibly in court, but in fact 
whenever regulation comes into play.  
 A variety of possibilities open to the historian.  Some of 
these involve mining the records for factual information.  For 
example, routine diagnosis of insanity appears to be 
understudied by medical historians.
17
  This may in part flow 
from the relatively haphazard practices of nineteenth-century 
medical record-keeping.  By comparison, at least some sets of 
legal records are comprehensive and consistent in format: by 
law, all patients admitted to an asylum were described in one 
or more medical reports prior to admission and, at least after 
1845, by the asylum superintendent in the asylum case book.
18
  
These documents contain discussions of what symptoms led a 
medical man to reach particular diagnoses, and potentially 
provide valuable insights into the day-to-day business of 
diagnosis.   
 Similarly, legal documents may cast further light on a 
internalist medical debates.  For example, a number of cases 
relating to the determination of civil capacity reflected the 
broader medical debate regarding the acceptance of partial 
insanity, monomania and moral insanity as diagnostic 
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categories.
19
  These are cases in which not merely legal, but 
also medical concepts were debated, and they thus offer 
potential insights into the history of those medical concepts. 
 While legal documents can certainly be of assistance in 
examining such questions, some care must be taken in this sort 
of analysis, for the pursuit of the legal process may also have 
substantive effects.  The completion of an admission document 
for an asylum, or the swearing of an affidavit attesting to the 
incapacity of a testator, require doctors to justify and thus 
to reflect on what they are doing differently than would be the 
case for diagnoses outside the legal arena.  The scrutiny of 
the documents by others might result in more care being taken, 
resulting perhaps in different weighting of diagnostic factors, 
or indeed different factors being considered altogether, than 
would be the case in a more private doctor-patient 
relationship.  Further, the legal record will record what the 
doctor believes will be relevant to the legal process.  This 
leads to a more abstract question, of potential interest to 
medical and legal historians alike:  do the legal and medical 
systems characterize problems in the same way, and if not, what 
does this tell us about both medicine and law?  The legal 
document becomes, not merely a record of medical diagnosis, but 
also a record of how the doctor plays out his (or perhaps, in 
the twentieth century, her) role in the legal system. 
 The tension, or the synthesis, or the dynamic creation 
between legal and medical theoretical frameworks is embodied in 
the doctor's legal role, and will be reflected in the document 
the doctor creates.  The influence of various factual, 
political, professional and ideological factors is 
appropriately the subject of historical debate in specific 
cases.  Relative influence of these factors may depend for 
example on the novelty of the medical and legal practice 
recorded in the document, the legal context, the experience of 
the doctor, and the facts of the individual case.  The 
relationship between law and medicine here must be perceived as 
dynamic:  the involvement of the doctors in the legal system 
affects the practices of both medicine and law.  The various 
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classes of documents identified below should thus not be 
considered as simply medical or alternatively legal.  Any 
document required by law to be kept will have a legal 
orientation, and any document where a medical person expresses 
professional views will have a medical orientation.  The 
importance is to understand the interface. 
 Notwithstanding its relevance, the legal context has been 
left largely unexamined in the history of madness.  There are 
studies particularly relating to criminal insanity and how 
doctors fared in the criminal courtroom,
20
 and there is a 
burgeoning literature on confinement in asylums.
21
  There has 
however been little attention paid to the use of medical 
testimony in cases of competency determination in civil law 
contexts such as wills, contracts, or marriage. Nor have 
historians registered particular interest in tort liability for 
causing `nervous shock',
22
 or in the willingness of the courts 
to award damages for mental illness when caused by physical 
injury.  Only some of the legal structures developed to deal 
with the mentally vulnerable and the mad involved the medical 
profession.  Scholars have not addressed issues such as why 
medical testimony became common in cases of testamentary 
capacity, but not in cases of non est factum
23
 or undue 
influence even though these cases involved similar sorts of 
people.  While potentially instructive to understand the 
relative roles of law and medicine, these failures to cross-
fertilize are as yet largely unexplored. 
 All of these issues contributed to the understanding of 
insanity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and all are 
ripe for historical research.  `Lunatics', `idiots', and the 
`feeble-minded' appeared in all the courts of the land, with a 
wide variety of legal problems.  The scope for research is 
therefore immense.  On some issues, such as tort liability, so 
little research has been done that it is not even clear what 
sets of documents remain, or what they would reveal.   
 Of necessity, this article cannot deal in any depth with 
the breadth of material available, and I do not claim to have 
expertise in all legal records of all courts.  What follows are 
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comments related specifically to the legal history of madness, 
intended to assist newcomers to make sense of the field.  
First, various general sources of broad application are 
identified.  Then three specific areas are discussed:  criminal 
insanity, findings of civil incompetency, and civil 
confinement. 
 
2. General Sources 
 
 The intricacies of law seem to pose a psychological 
barrier to medical historians.  They should not, since they are 
rarely as difficult as they appear at first blush.  
Nonetheless, access to a good text to explain both processes 
and doctrine is likely to be extremely helpful.  A plethora of 
these were written in the nineteenth century. A few helpful 
manuals are listed in appendix I to this article.  
 While the varieties of legal document are legion, most 
legal research will at some point involve reference to reported 
case law- the published reasons of judges in deciding 
particular cases. A brief note as to how to locate this may be 
of assistance.  Legal citations are of a relatively standard 
form, containing the name of the case (usually underlined or in 
italics), its year,
24
 the volume number of the report, the name 
of the report (usually abbreviated),
25
 and the page reference.  
Occasionally, the court which decided the case is also included 
in parentheses at the end of the cite.  If the case is reported 
in a number of places, several citations may be given. 
 Prior to the mid-1860s, case reports were published 
privately, and known by the person supervising the compilation 
of the collection.  Case reports that are the names of people 
are of this type.  Many, but not all, of these have been 
combined together in one set of case reports, the English 
Reports.  Some of the reports compiled contain some quite early 
cases.  Bellewe, for example, contains cases from 1378 to 1400, 
and Jenkins from 1220 to 1623.  That said, the vast bulk of the 
cases date from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth 
centuries, and this set of reports is the most important source 
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of printed case law for this period. The English Reports run to 
176 large volumes plus a two-volume index.  They will be 
contained in any good law library, and have also been published 
on CD-ROM.   
 In part because some libraries still have copies of the 
uncompiled reports, the tradition is that cases in these 
volumes are still cited by the original named series, not by 
their volume and page in the English Reports.
26
  A full list of 
the reports included in the English Reports can be found at the 
beginning of the first volume, or, usually, on a wall chart 
located near the reports in the library.  This list will also 
show which volumes contain which named series of reports. 
 Since 1865, an official set of law reports has been 
published.  These official reports include the Weekly Law 
Reports, Appeal Cases, Queen's Bench Reports,
27
 Admiralty and 
Probate Reports (to 1971), Family Reports (from 1972), Chancery 
Reports, Exchequer Reports (to 1880) and Common Pleas Reports 
(to 1880). They will again be contained in any good law 
library, and have also been published on CD-ROM.  They are all 
indexed together, in the so-called 'red' index.   
 The introduction of the official law reports did not, 
however, mean that private law reporting ceased. The medical 
historian may encounter references to a number of these, 
including the All England Reports, the Law Journal(Magistrates' 
Cases), the Law Times Reports, Cox's Criminal Cases, and the 
Justice of the Peace Reports.  While many of these are 
routinely available in all good law libraries, some private 
reports are not as readily available, so a certain amount of 
travel may be necessary. 
 A word of warning is appropriate.  Only a small minority 
of cases are reported.  Historically, jury trials are almost 
always not reported in traditional case reports (although 
appeals may be).  Case reports after all contain reasons for 
judgment, and juries, unlike judges, do not provide reasons for 
their decisions.  This is particularly problematic in the 
criminal sphere, where jury trials predominate.  These trials 
might, of course, be reported in considerable detail in the 
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regular newspapers, and the Times has historically been the 
newspaper referred to by lawyers in this regard.  Even for 
civil cases, only a small minority of cases are reported, and 
it is unlikely to be a statistically balanced sample.  The 
economics of litigation mean that reported case law is likely 
to concern predominantly wealthy parties.  The impact of law on 
other classes is less likely to appear in this source.  In 
addition, the cases reported are those of interest to lawyers 
of the period, generally because of their relevance in setting 
new legal precedent.  The fact that they are precedent-making 
may well indicate that they were factually or legally unusual: 
it cannot be assumed that they are `typical' of anything. 
 While much of the law regarding competency, tort 
liability, and criminal insanity is based in case law, statutes 
were also important, particularly those regarding committal in 
asylums and madhouses and matters of procedure.  Any good law 
library should have a complete run of statutes, organized 
chronologically.  Particularly significant statutes relating to 
idiocy, lunacy or mental deficiency will be mentioned in the 
general legal treatises in appendix I.  The 1957 Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency
28
 also contains a reasonable introduction to 
prior legislation.  Statutory consolidations can further be of 
assistance, both because they contain all the major statutes in 
one place, and because they contain important segments from 
otherwise unrelated legislation.  For the nineteenth century, 
the consolidation by Danby Fry
29
 is particularly helpful. 
 
3. Criminal Insanity 
 
 The treatment of the insane under criminal law is the one 
area where the history of law and madness has a large and 
diverse literature.  I will make no attempt here to summarize 
this literature, which tends to concern the development of the 
defence of insanity.  The first volume of Nigel Walker's Crime 
and Insanity in England
30
 provides the beginning researcher with 
a good starting point on the development of the law.   
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 Insanity arose in the criminal context in three 
situations:  fitness to plead, the defence of insanity, and the 
detention of insane prisoners.  The first of these situations 
relates to competence to conduct a defence, rather than 
ultimate responsibility for the crime.  By 1800, at both common 
law and by statute, a person found unfit to plead was not 
permitted to be tried, but was instead kept in strict custody 
'until His Majesty's pleasure be known'.
31
  The classic test to 
be applied is drawn from Baron Alderson's charge to the jury in 
R. v. Pritchard:   
 
 whether he [the accused] is of sufficient intellect 
to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, 
so as to make a proper defence - to know that he 
might challenge any of you to whom he may object - 
and to comprehend the details of the evidence, which 
in a case of this nature must constitute a minute 
investigation.
32
   
 
This legal threshhold has remained remarkably stable since 
1836, when that statement was made. 
 If the accused were fit to plead, insanity might still 
provide a substantive defence to the charge.  It is this stage 
that has provoked most scholarly interest.  The insanity 
defence was formalized by statute in 1800,
33
 but the statute did 
not establish an actual test of insanity for purposes of the 
defence.  Was the test simply that accused persons not 
understand that their actions were wrong?  Or illegal?  What if 
they were deluded into believing their actions were producing a 
public benefit, or redressing a supposed grievance or injury?  
What if the accused acted on what medical testimony indicated 
was an irresistible impulse?  Those questions were legally 
settled by McNaughten's Case in 1843,
34
 when the court set the 
standard which continues to apply:   
 
 ...it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the 
committing of the act, the party accused was 
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labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he 
did not know he was doing what was wrong. ... If the 
accused was conscious that the act was one which he 
ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time 
contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable.
35
 
 
Irresistible impulse, the test generally preferred by the 
nineteenth-century medical professionals, remained in Scotland 
as a plea in mitigation of sentence, but not south of the 
border.
36
  It was not until 1957 that a form of this test was 
adopted into English law,
37
 and then it was restricted to cases 
of murder, where the plea resulted in a reduction of the charge 
to voluntary manslaughter.  The relatively narrow definition 
contained in McNaughten's Case was not in line with medical 
thinking, and gave rise to considerable debate in the 
nineteenth century.  The result has been a corpus of work 
examining the interrelations between legal and medical 
conceptions of insanity and criminal law.
38
 
 Individuals found unfit to plead or not guilty by reason 
of insanity were detained 'until his Majesty's pleasure be 
known'.  That was likely to mean a long-term committal. Until 
1863, the place of detention was likely to be the local county 
asylum or, occasionally, Bethlem.
39
  When the new asylum at 
Broadmoor opened in 1863, it took the bulk of criminal 
lunatics.  Records of these institutions often continue to 
exist.  The actual warrants used to commit these individuals in 
the nineteenth century are relatively pro forma, although case 
books and other asylum sources can sometimes contain more 
detailed and specific information regarding the individuals and 
their circumstances.
40
 
 From this it will be clear that issues of insanity could 
occur throughout the criminal justice system.  The difficulty 
for the historian is that criminal proceedings tend to be oral, 
and juries leave no records as to their deliberations.  Useful 
records are therefore few.  Indictments (statements of the 
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charge), trial calendars (which will normally include 
verdicts), and gaol records may allow the tracking of 
individuals through the system, but they are not likely to 
provide detailed notes of evidence.  For that, reliance on 
secondary accounts, such as those contained in newspapers, will 
be necessary.  Here, particular mention should be made of the 
Old Bailey Sessions Papers.  These are accounts of trials at 
the Old Bailey (the central Criminal Court for London), 
starting in the early eighteenth century and continuing into 
the twentieth.  Virtually all trials
41
 are reported, with 
verbatim accounts of witness statements.  These accounts have 
already been used by Joel Eigen in his work on eighteenth-
century insanity cases, and those wishing to use this source 
should consult his work.
42
 
 
4. Findings of Civil Competency 
 
 Study of the determination of civil competency has been 
marginal in the history of modern law and madness to the point 
of being almost ignored.  Competency determinations through the 
use of the Royal Prerogative power were formalized by the 
beginning of the fourteenth century,
43
 thus well before civil or 
criminal confinements.  Other issues of civil competency were 
pervasive in the court system, and included questions of 
competence of witnesses to testify or parties to undertake 
proceedings, of testators to make a valid will, and of parties 
to make a valid contract.  Very little has been written 
regarding the history of these procedures, although a general 
introduction to English practice can be found in the Final 
Report of the Ontario Enquiry on Mental Competency.
44
   
 A perusal of reported case law would suggest that the 
field is also rife with material of interest to historians 
generally, and social, legal and medical historians in 
particular.  Rules for competency determination were undergoing 
substantial revision in the nineteenth century.  Older 
categorizations were disappearing.  Eighteenth-century courts 
had been resistant to finding incompetence where, for example, 
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the infirmity was the result of advanced age.
45
  This reluctance 
was giving way by the beginning of the nineteenth century.
46
  
Similarly, the requirement for a finding of idiocy that the 
individual's condition had to originate at or very near birth 
ceased by the mid-nineteenth century to be required as a matter 
of law.
47
  For lunacy, the progression of the nineteenth century 
shows a move away from the delusion as the sine qua non of 
incompetency,
48
 towards a more functional approach:  could the 
individual, as a matter of practicality, make the decision 
required of them?
49
 
 Existing research does not address the degree to which 
these changes were a result of pressures from within the legal 
system, from the broader socio-economic system, or from medical 
professionalisation.  The move towards a functional test of 
competency could perhaps be portrayed as a response to the 
needs of the broader economic system, and on its face does not 
suggest a more medicalized approach.  At the same time, medical 
evidence appears to be increasingly common in these cases, and 
medical debates and developments are reflected in the case law. 
For example, the move in the case law away from the 
understanding of idiocy as a condition beginning at or near 
birth corresponds to a similar movement in the medical 
literature, where symptoms similar to idiocy ceased to be 
understood as necessarily originating at birth.
50
 The political 
situation was also changing, however.  An early reluctance of 
courts to find an individual an idiot under the Royal 
Prerogative power may well have flowed from the fact that, in 
such a situation, the Crown would keep the profits of the 
idiot's land.  A lunacy finding, by comparison, would require 
the profits to be passed on to the lunatic or his or her heirs 
upon termination of the Crown's control.  The demise of the 
financial interest of the Crown following the English 
revolution removed any financial influence upon the court's 
finding.   
 In legal practice, and for discussion of the mechanics of 
research, the determination of civil competence may 
conveniently be divided into two aspects.  First, there was the 
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Royal Prerogative power, a process by which individuals could 
be declared to be an idiot or lunatic, and their common law 
rights restricted.  Secondly, issues of competency could be 
raised in specific litigation, most frequently on the question 
of whether an individual was competent to execute a will or 
contract.  While the same sorts of factual situation fell to be 
determined under both procedures, they were completely separate 
processes, governed by separate legal structures.  While the 
issue under the former procedure was expressly the lunacy or 
idiocy of the individual, the issue under the latter was 
whether the will was valid or the contract enforceable.  The 
former was heard by specific administrative officials.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century, a considerable statutory basis had 
developed for its procedures.  The forum for the latter was 
determined by the type of action at issue - almost always a 
trial - and was governed almost exclusively by precedent rather 
than statute.   
 
4.1 The Royal Prerogative Power 
 
 The Royal Prerogative power (also called issuing a 
Commission in Lunacy or being found lunatic or idiot 'by 
inquisition') was the closest England came to a general finding 
of insanity. In its mediaeval origins, it had the effect of 
making the subject, called the 'lunatic so found', a ward of 
the Crown and delivering his or her estate into the control of 
the King.
51
  By the nineteenth century, with developments in 
other areas of the law of insanity, it could no longer be 
considered to have such a global effect.  Thus while the 
Prerogative could in theory give the Crown control not merely 
of the estate, but also of the person of the lunatic or idiot,
52
 
the nineteenth-century statutes indicate that documents 
allowing committal to madhouses still had to be completed if 
the individual had been found lunatic by inquisition.
53
   
Similarly, while an order under the Royal Prerogative power 
prior to the execution of a will raised a presumption of 
testamentary incapacity, it did not preclude a trial of the 
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issue.
54
  Even in the law of contract, the effect of the 
Commission was dubious until 1904 on the question of whether a 
contract signed by the subject during a 'lucid interval' was 
valid.
55
  
 The power to exercise the Royal Prerogative was awarded by 
each monarch upon ascension to the throne.  Following the 
demise of the Court of Wards in the seventeenth century,
56
 the 
convention was to give it to the Lord Chancellor.
57
  By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, his role appears to have 
been essentially administrative.  The actual conduct of the 
inquisition was entrusted to Masters in Lunacy (before 1845 
called Commissioners in Lunacy),
58
 officials appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor.  Up to 1842, the Masters were judges; after 
that time they were barristers of at least ten years standing.
59
 
Before 1833, the proceedings were under the control of three of 
these officials; after 1833, one official had control of the 
inquisition.
60
  If the alleged lunatic or idiot requested a jury 
trial, that would mean empannelling a jury and hearing 
evidence, orally or in writing.  If no such request were made 
by the subject of the inquiry, the Master could after 1853 
determine the matter without a jury.
61
 
 The guide to the Public Record Office indicates that, up 
to 1874, the Masters were a part of the Petty Bag Office, a 
division which also dealt with admission of solicitors to 
practice and bankruptcy.  At that time, they became a part of 
the Chancery division directly.  Under the 1890 legislation, 
they became a part of the Management and Estates Division of 
the Supreme Court of Judicature.  They were then incorporated 
into the Court of Protection when that court was founded in 
1947.   
 The guide further suggests that limited documentation 
remains prior to the foundation of the Court of Protection.  
The Commissions themselves still exist for the years 1627 
through 1932.
62
  These are unfortunately mainly pro forma, 
although in the second half of the nineteenth century they do 
sometimes provide an indication of the person at whose 
instigation the inquisition was sought.  Until 1853, they are 
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indexed.
63
  No other relevant nineteenth-century material
64
 
appears to survive in these documentary classes, although the 
documents have not been completely indexed.
65
 
 Once the individual was found lunatic or idiot by 
inquisition, the management of his or her estate was generally 
committed to an individual called a `committee',
66
 and their 
person to a guardian.  Prior to the nineteenth century, members 
of the individual's family would generally be precluded from 
serving as personal guardians, as their status as potential 
heirs was perceived to create a conflict of interest with the 
lunatic's well-being.
67
  By the nineteenth century, this rule 
had disappeared, and family members were generally appointed, 
although the court continued to have a supervisory role.  This 
system was considerably altered in 1853, when a formal grant of 
committeeship was abolished, and the individual was placed 
directly under court administration.
68
 
 After 1833, a finding of lunacy or idiocy by inquisition 
also triggered visits of the individual by Chancery Visitors.
69
 
 The Visitors included two physicians in actual practice, and a 
barrister of not less than five years standing.  The Masters 
were also ex officio Visitors commencing in 1842.  The 
frequency of visits varied over the course of the century.
70
  
The rationale for these visits appears to have been largely to 
ensure proper care of the insane persons.  The Public Record 
Office still has some administrative documents relevant to the 
Chancery Visitors for the nineteenth century.
71
  No reports of 
their actual visits exist, however; they were required by 
statute to be destroyed upon the death of the insane person, or 
the superseding of the Commission.
72
 
 
4.2 Other Issues of Competency 
 
 Issues of capacity in the context of a specific will arise 
in probate courts, and in the context of specific contracts in 
the courts of common law and equity which had jurisdiction to 
try contractual matters.  The jurisdiction of the various 
courts in these matters is too complicated to be dealt with 
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here.  Contractual litigation arose in a wide variety of courts 
of common law and equity, and litigation regarding wills was 
split between civil courts and ecclesiastical courts until 
1857.  Essentially, probate of real property was determined in 
the civil courts, and of personal property in the 
ecclesiastical courts.  Wills concerning both realty and 
personalty were admitted to probate in both courts.  If the 
will concerned small amounts of personal property in one 
diocese, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction would be usually be 
exercised in the local Bishop's court.  For other estates of 
personalty, the matter would be heard by the Prerogative Court 
of Canterbury or York.   
 The documentation concerning competency is to be found in 
the records of these various courts.  This raises the 
difficulty for the researcher as to how relevant documents are 
to be located, from the morass of court documents remaining.  
There is no easy answer to this problem.  One strategy would 
involve finding the names and dates of relevant cases in law 
reports, and finding the documents relevant to those cases.  
While this might result in a relatively direct route to 
relevant documentation, it has its limitations.  As noted 
above, reported cases do not necessarily represent a balanced 
sample.  It may in the end be the case that for at least some 
types of research, there is no substitute for slogging through 
the profusion of remaining manuscripts. 
 This sounds daunting but, for testamentary capacity, there 
are some indications that the rewards may be considerable.  My 
brief sampling of documents from the Prerogative Court of 
Canterbury would suggest that testamentary capacity was often 
raised in probate litigation in that court.  The documents of 
that court are particularly interesting.  First, the probate 
documents are arranged as separate classes in the Public Record 
Office, minimizing the drudgery of scanning for relevant 
material.  Secondly, the procedures of the ecclesiastical 
courts were such that much of the evidence was taken in 
writing, and remains in the files.  Particularly in major 
cases, considerable amounts of interesting documentation are 
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thus available.
73
 
 
5. Civil Confinement 
 
 The history of the insanity defence and of the legal 
determination of competency centres on the study of court 
decisions, and thus sits at the centre of what has been 
traditionally thought of as history of law.  Court decisions 
did occasionally occur regarding civil confinement,
74
 but they 
were relatively uncommon.  The history of civil confinement is 
more a branch of the history of administrative law, where 
decisions were made by officials pursuant to statute, and where 
facilities were subject to state inspection and regulation.  
That said, it must be remembered that administrative law was 
itself in the process of formulation in the nineteenth 
century.
75
  Litigation did eventually occur as to whether the 
powers of Justices of the Peace to confine lunatics were 
judicial or administrative in nature, but not until 1899.
76
  For 
much of the nineteenth century, it is not clear that Justices 
themselves would have distinguished these functions. 
 The legal framework for civil committal, from its 
foundations in the eighteenth century through to the creation 
of the National Health Service in the mid-twentieth century, 
distinguished between privately paying patients and paupers.
77
  
Until 1890, private madhouses were subject to different 
legislation from county asylums.  There were few private 
patients in county asylums, and the administrative pressure 
from the central inspectorate, albeit not entirely successful, 
was against having paupers in private facilities.  These 
distinctions were relevant for the admission processes to the 
facilities and the inspection jurisdiction of the central 
authority. 
 Procedures for admission to facilities were dependent on 
the legal status of the individual.  Admission of paupers 
either to the asylum or the private madhouse was by order of a 
Justice of the Peace, although a medical certificate was also 
required.
78
  Private patients, by comparison, were until 1890 
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admitted on the strength of two medical certificates and an 
application of a family member.
79
  The 1890 Lunacy Act altered 
these procedures by providing the private patient with a 
hearing before a Justice of the Peace.
80
  The law required that 
all nineteenth-century patients, whether in madhouses or county 
asylums, be subject to these procedures.  While the madhouse 
acts commencing in 1853 began to allow an individual to remain 
in a licenced house voluntarily as a boarder following cure,
81
 
the broader concept of voluntary admission as a patient did not 
receive legislative cognizance until 1930.
82
 
 In addition, a considerable number of insane persons were 
kept in union workhouses, largely outside the scope of the 
lunacy legislation.
83
  Until 1867, they had an ambiguous status. 
 While apparently they were often prevented from leaving the 
workhouse by the union authorities, they were not legally 
confined under the terms of the lunacy statutes.  This 
situation was changed by an 1867 statute, which allowed the 
workhouse medical officer to confine persons in workhouses 
under specified circumstances.
84
  Sadly, few records appear to 
remain explaining how this jurisdiction was exercised. 
 While processes for admission to an asylum or madhouse 
depended on the legal status of the individual, the applicable 
administrative framework depended on the type of facility.  
County asylums were essentially under the control of the 
Justices of the Peace in quarter session.  Legislation in 1808 
had for the first time allowed Justices to order asylum 
construction, and provided that it be funded by county rates.
85
 
 Even when county asylums became mandatory in 1845,
86
 county 
Justices remained in control.  They approved construction, and 
appointed from their number a management committee.  It was not 
until 1888 that these asylums were passed over to local 
authority control, along with the other administrative business 
of quarter sessions.
87
  Even then, Justices retained control of 
admissions until 1959. 
 Private madhouses were privately owned, but subject to a 
licensing regime commencing in 1774.
88
  From then on, provincial 
houses were licensed by quarter sessions.  From 1774 to 1828, 
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metropolitan houses were to be licensed by a committee of the 
Royal College of Physicians.  This was felt to be inadequate, 
and in 1828, the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy were 
created.
89
  From 1828 into the twentieth century, this body or 
its successors from 1845, the Commissioners in Lunacy,
90
 
licensed metropolitan houses. 
 The Commissioners in Lunacy had a broader role as well.  
In 1842, they conducted a national inspection of county 
asylums, madhouses, and some workhouses.
91
  This national 
inspection function was made permanent in 1845.  In addition, 
increasingly over the course of the nineteenth century, the 
Commissioners in Lunacy received the authority to approve plans 
for county asylums and madhouses, advise on construction of or 
addition to county asylums, to ensure compliance with the legal 
requisites of committal, and to order the transfer of patients 
between facilities.  For private madhouses, the Commissioners 
acquired the power to order the discharge of patients.  It 
would appear that the Commissioners in Lunacy tended to rely on 
persuasion rather than the legal force of these powers;
92
 
nonetheless, the powers were there. 
 Documentary records continue to exist both for the central 
authorities, and, often, at the local level as well.  The 
lunacy statutes prescribed a variety of documents that had to 
be kept, including patient registers, case books, and admission 
documents.  The following discussion will focus on the legal 
character of these documents.  Some were intended to convince 
that legal standards were being met.  Others had their content 
defined largely according to administrative order by the Lunacy 
Commissioners.  The remarks which follow are to serve the dual 
purpose of introducing the range of documents available, and 
convincing medical historians who already work on these 
documents that legal historical issues are relevant to their 
work. 
 
5.1 Local Documents 
 
 The survival of documents of local facilities is, 
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predictably, a hit-and-miss affair.  Occasionally, the 
documents of private facilities are found in private or public 
archive collections.
93
  Documents from county asylums seem more 
uniformly preserved.  Some of these institutions are still 
functional, and hold their own records; others have donated 
their records to county record offices.   
 Throughout the modern period, significant care of the 
insane has been provided through the poor law. Until 1834, this 
was the responsibility of local magistrates the quarter 
sessions records detailing admissions to poor houses, 
bridewells and outdoor relief contain indications of the care 
of the insane in this period.
94
 Even after 1834, the poor law 
remained involved.  When paupers were admitted to county 
asylums or, more rarely, private facilities, the bulk of the 
administration was handled by the poor law relieving officer, 
and (especially after 1853) the poor law medical officer.
95
  
Further, as noted above, a considerable number of insane 
persons were kept in workhouses.  Poor law union records, now 
generally kept in county archives, are thus also a potential 
source of information.   
 County asylums were run until 1888 by the local Justices 
of the Peace.  Their minutes, along with those of their asylum 
sub-committee, will be filed with other quarter sessions 
documents in county record offices.  The content of these 
minutes is a somewhat hit and miss affair. They may contain 
helpful information for particularly significant events, such 
as the construction of a new asylum, and they may well document 
the rules and schedules of the asylum, and discussion of 
employment and termination of employment of asylum staff, 
particularly the medical superintendent, the clerk of the 
asylum, the bursar and the chaplain.  There does not appear to 
be any consistent policy as to the degree of delegation of 
management from the asylum sub-committee, however.  In some 
asylums, the committee appears to have been content to leave 
day-to-day matters and medical treatment to the asylum staff.  
In others, the Justices remained influential even in the 
minutiae of running the asylum, and their records can be 
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extremely informative.  Hanwell asylum in London provides a 
particularly good example of such interventionist magistrates. 
 Akihito Suzuki uses the quarter sessions papers to show that 
the Justices, at least as much as medical superintendent John 
Conolly were the instigators of non-restraint at that 
institution from the end of the 1830s.
96
  Quarter sessions 
records do not however tend to include a great deal of 
information about individual patients, where nineteenth-century 
admission documents and case books tend to provide more 
complete information. 
 The documents required to be kept by county asylums and 
private madhouses were defined by statute, and the forms can 
generally be found as schedules to the major acts.
97
  By mid-
nineteenth century, they included admission documents, medical 
case books, and various registers of patients.
98
  In addition, 
there may be account books, medical journals, annual reports, 
report books completed by visiting Justices, Commissioners in 
Lunacy and poor law officials, and, for county asylums, reports 
between the medical superintendent and the management committee 
of Justices of the Peace.   
 Until 1890, admission of paying patients to private 
madhouses was largely a private affair:  a reception order, 
coupled with two medical certificates from physicians, 
surgeons, or apothecaries was sufficient to result in an 
individual's committal.  All the same, these documents were 
effectively required to make out a case for the committal.  The 
application itself was primarily personal details, but did 
require a statement of treatment history, and duration and 
supposed cause of existing attack.  By 1853, the form of the 
medical certificate required the medic to examine the alleged 
lunatic personally, and to specify both the facts observed 
which indicated insanity, and also the facts communicated by 
another party.
99
   
 All these forms were scrutinized by the Commissioners in 
Lunacy, who might apply pressure for the release of a person 
confined on improper documentation.  These are thus not merely 
medical reports; they are also legal documents stating a case 
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for confinement, to an administrative tribunal.  This is even 
clearer regarding pauper patients.  They could be admitted only 
upon the authority of a Justice of the Peace, and the 
application and medical certificate can therefore be understood 
as a submission convincing the Justice to sign the order.
100
 
 The argument for the legal nature of medical case books is 
twofold.  First is a parallel argument to the admission 
documents.  The readers of the case books included not merely 
the medical superintendent of the facility, but also the 
Commissioners in Lunacy, and, where applicable, the Visiting 
Justices (for county asylums and provincial madhouses).  The 
intervention of these officials could result in the discharge 
of the patient, and the case books can thus be seen in part as 
indicating the medical superintendent's re-enforcement of the 
appropriateness of the committal.
101
 
 Secondly, the content of the medical case book was legally 
defined.  Where statutes defined the content of admission 
documents, case books were required to comply with a long 
directive from the Commissioners in Lunacy.  Consistent with a 
Benthamite streak in nineteenth-century administration, the 
case books were to keep particulars 'in a manner so clear and 
distinct, that they may admit of being easily referred to, and 
extracted, whenever the Commissioners shall so require'.
102
  
Personal details, appearance, symptoms, and history were to be 
recorded in specified detail. The form does appear to have been 
influential.  My own research does show departures from this 
standard, but these were largely consistent with the aim of re-
enforcing the appropriateness of the committal as described 
above.
103
 
 The point here is not that these medical records are 
irrelevant to understanding the development of psychiatric 
science.  Medical men presumably acted in the utmost good faith 
in their completion.  They did so, however, in a legal context, 
which must be taken into account in assessing the documents. 
 
5.2 Documents of the Central Authorities 
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 Medical historians are well aware of the existence of the 
central commissioners (although the records of the Poor Law 
Commissioners tend to be overlooked in favour of those of the 
Lunacy Commission).  Both sets of commissioners left 
considerable archives.  These records, like those of the 
doctors discussed above, are not merely medical records, but 
records in an administrative law context.  That context, 
tremendously important to their nature and structure, must be 
addressed in order that a full picture of the records may be 
obtained. 
 The records of both the Commissioners in Lunacy and the 
Poor Law Commissioners are held in the Public Record Office at 
Kew.  The collections for both are extensive, and include 
minutes of meetings, reports of visits, correspondence with 
local officials and with each other, legal opinions, 
collections of circular letters and orders, and reports of 
special inquiries.  These records have their advantages.  They 
are often indexed by the nineteenth-century clerks, and they 
are extensive in their range.  These same factors are also 
their disadvantages, however:  the indices are not entirely 
reliable, and not designed with the interests of twenty-first-
century historians in mind.  At the same time, the sheer 
quantity of paper makes systematic study without relying on 
indices an onerous task.  This is less of a problem for persons 
engaged in local studies, since correspondence with local 
officials is organized geographically. 
 The Commissioners in Lunacy were a mixed crew of 
barristers, physicians, and laity, representing both 
utilitarian and evangelical ideologies.  Appointments might be 
made according to either expertise or patronage.  Samuel 
Gaskell, for example, was a former superintendent of the 
Lancaster Asylum and co-founder of the Association of Medical 
Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane, the 
organization which after considerable permutation became the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists.
104
  At the other extreme, Dr. 
Herbert appears to have had almost no specialist knowledge; his 
chief qualification for becoming a commissioner in 1858 appears 
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to have been that he was physician to the Lord Lieutenant.
105
 
 The inclusion of both doctors and lawyers as Commissioners 
in Lunacy provides a tantalizing opportunity to examine how 
legal and medical perspectives interacted, in the development 
of policy.  Unlike the contexts of the criminal trial and the 
finding of civil incompetency, where medical perspectives had 
to gain acceptance in fields already occupied by judges and 
barristers, the Commissioners in Lunacy included both doctors 
and lawyers from the beginning, suggesting a more level playing 
field between the two discourses.  While this approach has its 
appeal, it is not without its limitations.  The number of 
commissioners was small enough, the pressures to co-operate 
strong enough, and the variety of legal and medical approaches 
current great enough, that the views of 'legal' and 'medical' 
commissioners cannot easily be typified.  The situation is 
further complicated by the importance of other themes in 
administrative history, such as the degree of administrative 
centralization that was appropriate and the tensions among 
Benthamism, a belief in market forces, and evangelicalism, 
cutting across professional lines.
106
 
 The Poor Law Commissioners present a somewhat different 
set of issues.  Certainly, they were not necessarily 
unsympathetic to medical perspectives.  The other co-founder of 
the Association of Medical Officers of Asylums and Hospitals 
for the Insane, Samuel Hitch, was on the staff of the Poor Law 
Commission commencing in the early 1840s.  While issues of 
lunacy were not central to the Commissioners' work, a 
voluminous correspondence with local unions on the subject did 
develop.  The theoretical problem at the base of the Poor Law 
Commissioners' work was how asylums and the treatment of the 
insane were to be understood in the context of the broader 
statutory regime created by the introduction of the New Poor 
Law in 1834.  It is therefore less a question of competing 
professional ideologies, although that is certainly present as 
poor law medical officers worked to promote the medical 
perspective in the poor law, and more a question of how 
competing legal frameworks are to be reconciled.
107
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 In the twentieth century, the tendency is to take 
regulatory structures for granted.  It must be emphasized that 
such a view is entirely inappropriate in considering the 
nineteenth century.  For both central authorities, continued 
existence was a tenuous matter.  Centralized authority was 
highly controversial at the local level, and the behaviour of 
both sets of commissioners is to be understood accordingly.  
The legal power of the Commissioners to effect change was 
firmly limited.  Exercise of even these limited  legal powers 
in a high-handed way would carry significant political costs, 
and might be counter-productive in the longer term.  There was 
a pressure on the commissioners to be ingratiating in 
communications with local authorities.  Similarly, their annual 
and special reports cannot be divorced from this political 
culture:  these reports had to convince the funder that a good 
job was being done.  These pressures permeated the work of the 
central authorities; it is ill-advised to take their statements 
as in any way 'objective', or divorced from this political, 
legal and constitutional context. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Far from being the new kid on the block, law has been 
concerned with madness for centuries.  While the insanity 
defence and the confinement of the insane are of course 
important sites of that concern, the legal interest in madness 
extends throughout the legal realm, both in the court structure 
and in the plethora of documents defining and articulating 
legal relations.  The documents discussed above provide 
opportunities to the historian to juxtapose the theoretical 
conceptions of madness articulated by law and medicine.  The 
conceptions are not (or at least not always) antagonistic.  
Often, legal and medical approaches interact in co-operative 
ways, raising the question of whether they should be considered 
two histories or one. 
 This complexity of legal and medical relations exists not 
merely on a theoretical, but also on a practical level.  
  
 
 29 
Certainly, there are cases of legal and medical antagonism; but 
the nineteenth century shows equally increasing reliance of the 
law on doctors and of doctors on the law. The pragmatics of 
these relations call into question the neat divisions between 
legal and medical history.  When for example poor law medical 
officers invoked the terms of the Lunacy Acts to press for the 
assistance of the poor law central authorities against local 
guardians, as they did in the 1860s, the lines between legal 
and medical history become refreshingly indistinct.  Certainly, 
this was in part an attempt to develop their local employment 
conditions, but equally it can be read as a move towards 
professionalization of the care of the insane.  For the central 
authorities, it was in part about the provision of good medical 
care for the insane poor, but equally about the formation of 
alliances to buttress the precarious political position of the 
central authority, a matter of constitutional debate.  
Reference to legal sources, and acknowledging the legal 
significance of sources to which reference is already made, 
allows consideration of new levels of complexity in the history 
of lunacy. 
 The legal history of madness remains understudied.  
Valuable work has been done on the history of criminal 
insanity, and work is beginning to appear regarding confinement 
in private madhouses and county asylums.  The insights gained 
therein have not, by and large, been extended into the civil 
issues of competency determination nor have relations between 
law and medicine been theorized outside the context of criminal 
insanity.  The documents are readily available:  it is a 
discipline waiting to happen. 
 
Appendix I:  Treatises 
 
Archbold.  The Law Relating to Lunacy (London:  1854)  
Additional editions in 1877 (ed. W.C. Glen and A. Glen), 1890 
and 1895 (ed. S.G. Lushington), and 1915 (ed. J.W. Grieg and 
W.H. Gattie).  Annotated asylum acts, including rules made 
pursuant to the acts. 
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Brydall, John.  Non Compos Mentis:  Or the Law Relating to 
Natural Fools, Mad-Folks and Lunatick Persons (London: 1700).  
For indication of law prior to nineteenth century.  Essentially 
a question and answer format, focussing on civil capacity and 
inquisitorial process. 
 
Elmer, Joseph.  The Practice in Lunacy under Commissions and 
Inquisitions (London: 1844).  Seven editions by 1892.  Focusses 
on the inquisitorial process.  Somewhat legalistic in style.  
Includes relevant statutes. 
 
Fry, Danby.  The Lunacy Acts,(London, 1864).   Very usefully 
brings all relevant statutes together into one place, with 
liberal although somewhat legalistic annotations.  Includes 
introductions on inquisitorial matters, civil confinement, and 
criminal law.  Limited to statutes; thus no discussion of 
testamentary or contractual capacity, insanity defence.  Not to 
be confused with similar work of same name by the same author 
published in 1854, which is not as comprehensive. 
 
Highmore, A.  Treatise on Law of Idiocy and Lunacy (London, 
1807).  Shows the state of the law immediately prior to the 
introduction of county asylums.  Particularly strong on 
inquisitorial process and other civil capacity, but also some 
discussion of criminal responsibility. 
 
Pitt-Lewis, G., Percy Smith, and J.A. Hawke.   The Insane and 
the Law (London, 1895).  Good general text, including civil 
detention, civil capacity, inquisitorial issues, and criminal 
insanity.  Designed in part for medical readership, therefore 
not as legalistic as some other texts. 
 
Pope, H.M.R.  A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy  
(London, 1877).  Second edition, 1892.  One of the classic 
texts.  Somewhat legalistic. 
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Renton, Alexander W.  The Law and Practice of Lunacy (Edinburgh 
and London, 1896).  Concerns civil competency and crime only; 
not inquisitorial process.  Very detailed and helpful for 
specific points of law, but legalistic and probably 
intimidating to the neophyte.  
 
Sabben, James T., and J.H. Balfour Browne.  Handbook on Lunacy 
and Law (London, 1872).  Written by a physician and a barrister 
for a medical readership, this is a very straightforward 
discussion of procedures for examining and completing required 
documentation, including samples of forms appropriately 
completed.  Discussion centres on civil confinement and 
inquisitorial process, to the exclusion of criminal matters. 
 
Shelford, Leonard.  A Practical Treatise of the Law concerning 
Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons of Unsound Mind (London, 1833).  
Second edition:  1847.  Good, general, mid-century text. 
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Appendix 2:  Abbreviations of Case Report Series 
 
Note:  while most abbreviations are reasonably standard, some 
variations do occur.  In addition, some reports have similar 
names. The following list does not include the large number of 
private reports re-printed in the 176-volume English Reports. A 
list of those abbreviations is contained in the first volume of 
those reports and generally on a wall chart located near those 
reports in law libraries. When in difficulty, check with 
library staff. 
 
A.C.   Appeal Cases 
All E.R.  All England Reports 
C.C.C.  Cox's Criminal Cases 
Ch.   Chancery Reports 
Cr.App.R.  Criminal Appeal Reports 
Ex.   Exchequer Reports (or Exch.) 
Fam.   Family Reports 
H.L.   House of Lords Cases (or L.R.H.L.) 
Howell's St.Tr. Howell's State Trials 
J.P.   Justice of the Peace Reports 
K.B.   King's Bench Reports 
L.T.   Law Times Reports 
LJ Ex  Law Journal (Exchequer Cases) 
LJ MC  Law Journal (Magistrates Cases)  
LJ QB  Law Journal (Queen's Bench Cases) 
[LJ (NS) indicates the second series of Law Journal 
reports.] 
P.   Probate Reports 
P.C.   Privy Council Cases (or L.R.P.C.) 
Q.B.   Queen's Bench Reports 
St.Tr.  State Trials 
T.L.R.  Times Law Reports 
W.L.R.   Weekly Law Reports 
 
     
*
M.A., LL.B., Ph.D., of the Bar of Ontario.  Senior 
Lecturer, School of Law, University of Nottingham.  My thanks 
to Stephen Girvin, David Wright and Alan Yoshioka for 
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commenting on drafts of this article. 
     
1
De Prerogativa Regis, 17 Edw. II, stat I, (1324). 
     
2
See Ontario, Ministry of Health, Enquiry into Mental 
Competence, (Toronto, 1990) p. 324; G. Robertson, Mental 
Disability and the Law in Canada (Toronto, 1987) p. 8; N.A. 
Heywood and A.S. Massey, Court of Protection Practice, 9th ed., 
D.G. Hunt and M.E. Reed (eds.), (London, 1971). 
3
It is not until 1991 that a jury was required following a 
finding of unfitness to plead to determine whether the accused 
even did the act they were accused of:  see Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s. 2.  Even this 
amendment does not allow defences to be raised, in the event 
that the accused is found to have committed the act in 
question. 
  
     
4
As an example of this sort of approach in the eighteenth 
century, see M. MacDonald, 'Lunatics and the State in Georgian 
England', Social History of Medicine, 2 (1989), 299-313, which 
examines breaches of trust and corruption in the administration 
of estates of lunatics by the Court of Chancery. 
5
See P. Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy, (London, 1999), 
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